The effect of ECB communication on interest rates: An assessment by unknown
The effect of ECB communication on interest rates:
An assessment
Jakob De Haan
Received: 29 February 2008 /Revised: 13 August 2008 /Accepted: 25 September 2008 /
Published online: 29 October 2008
# The Author(s) 2008. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This paper reviews the literature on the communication policy of the
European Central Bank (ECB) addressing two questions. First, to what extent has ECB
communication affected interest rates? Second, to what extent has ECB communication
affected the predictability of the ECB’s interest rate decisions? On the basis of a survey
of empirical studies, it is concluded that various forms of ECB communication lead to
more volatility. However, studies focusing on volatility cannot assess whether markets
moved in the intended direction. To analyze whether this is the case, researchers have
coded ECB communications. Studies using this approach yield evidence that
communications generally move financial markets in the intended direction. There is
also substantive evidence that ECB communications increase the predictability of
interest decisions by the ECB Governing Council. Finally, the consequences of the fact
that ECB officials often gave contrasting signals to market participants are analyzed.
New evidence suggests that inconsistent communication causes agents to make less
accurate predictions. The policy implication is that central bankers should take care that
their statements are consistent.
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“Our keen preoccupation with making ourselves understood by words and
deeds has established a new climate of mutual understanding with academics,
investors, market participants and public opinion at large.” (Trichet 2005)
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Since monetary policy is increasingly becoming the art of managing expectations,
communication has developed into a key instrument in the central bankers’ toolbox
in recent years. There is only a single tool (the overnight interest rate) that can be
used by central banks to exert an (indirect) effect on those asset prices that are of key
importance for the economy, such as long-term interest rates, equity prices, and
exchange rates. Communication, therefore, provides an important means for central
banks to influence these asset prices. First, communication may be used to guide
private sector expectations. As such, it plays an important role in improving the
effectiveness of policy and, in the end, the economy’s overall performance. Trichet
(2005) even states: “under some conditions the central bank can regain control of
private expectations without necessarily changing interest rates, but by being visibly
and credibly “alert,” explaining and stressing its commitment to maintaining
inflation at levels consistent with the price stability objective. The threat to act will
be more effective the more credible the central bank has been over time in actually
delivering price stability, as defined quantitatively.”
Second, communication may be used to reduce noise in financial markets. Greater
disclosure and clarity over policy may lead to greater predictability of central bank
actions, which, in turn, reduces uncertainty in financial markets. There is a strongly-
held belief among central bankers nowadays that a high degree of predictability is
important. As Poole (2001, p. 9) put it: “The presumption must be that market
participants make more efficient decisions... when markets can correctly predict
central bank actions.”
The extent to which central bank communication has been successful is very
much an empirical issue. Therefore, it is no surprise that the empirical literature on
communication has seen major developments in recent years. This paper reviews the
literature on the communication policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). We ask
two questions. First, to what extent has ECB communication affected interest rates?
Second, to what extent has ECB communication affected the predictability of the
ECB’s interest rate decisions?
In addressing these questions, we survey studies focusing on the impact of the
ECB’s communication on interest rates and the predictability of policy decisions.1
We start by identifying why central bank communication may affect financial
markets. To assess the impact of ECB communication empirically, authors have
come up with various indicators of ECB communication. As part of our discussion
of the literature, we compare these indicators. We conclude that there are substantial
differences across these indicators. Despite these differences, it turns out that there is
quite some evidence suggesting that ECB communication affects interest rates (and
also some other asset prices). Likewise, most research concludes that ECB
communication has increased the predictability of monetary policy. However, we
point out that communication may also hamper to correctly predict policy decisions
due to what we call communication dispersion. Central bank talk is not always
1 We do not discuss studies like those of Fratzscher (2004), Jansen and De Haan (2005, 2007a), Siklos and
Bohl (2006) and Conrad and Lamla (2007) that focus on the impact of ECB communication on the euro-
dollar exchange rate.
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consistent: ECB officials often gave contrasting signals to market participants. These
diverging signals were related to various aspects of monetary policy, such as the
policy inclination, or the economic outlook. It is likely that this dispersion affects the
ability of market participants to correctly predict monetary policy decisions (Jansen
and De Haan 2006).2 We present new evidence on the impact of communication
dispersion, following a similar approach as Ehrman and Fratzscher (2005) and using
a unique dataset of statements made by euro area central bankers during the first
years of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This period is
interesting as both the ECB and financial markets had to learn how to deal with
communication by a newly created international organization.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines why central bank
communication may affect financial markets. Section 3 briefly describes the ECB’s
communication policies and Section 4 discusses various indicators of ECB commu-
nication. Section 5 reviews empirical work assessing whether ECB communications
have affected interest rates and the predictability of policy decisions. Section 6
presents new evidence on the impact of communication dispersion on the
predictability of ECB policy decisions. Finally, Section 7 offers some concluding
comments.
2 Why Does Central Bank Communication Matter?
Central bank communication can be defined as the provision of information by the
central bank to the public on the objectives of monetary policy, the monetary policy
strategy, the economic outlook, and (the outlook for future) policy decisions.
It is widely accepted that nowadays the ability of central banks to affect the
economy critically depends upon their ability to influence market expectations
regarding the future path of overnight interest rates, and not merely their current
level. Therefore, the public’s understanding of current and future policy is critical for
the effectiveness of policy. Still, it is not obvious that communication may help the
central bank realizing its ultimate objective(s), like price stability and stable
economic growth. From a theoretical point of view, communication has little value
added if the central bank credibly commits to a policy rule. Assuming that the public
has rational expectations, any systematic pattern in the way that policy is conducted
should be correctly inferred from the central bank’s observed behaviour (Woodford
2005). Thus, when it comes to predicting future interest rates, it suffices to interpret
(forecasts of) economic data in view of the central bank’s policy rule; there is no
need for central bank communication. Following Faust and Svensson’s (2001,
p. 373) definition of central bank transparency—i.e., how easily the public can
deduce central-bank goals and intentions from ‘observables’—one might say that a
central bank can be fully transparent without any communication.
This stylized example makes clear that there are, essentially, three conditions
under which central bank communication may matter: non-rational expectations,
2 Indeed, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b) find for three central banks (the Federal Reserve, the ECB, and
the Bank of England) that a higher degree of dispersion in communication lowered the predictability of
their policy decisions (as measured by the difference between actual and expected decisions).
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absence of policy rules and credibility, and asymmetric information. If one or more
of these conditions hold, central bank communication may have an impact on the
economy.
First, the assumption that the public will understand monetary policy perfectly
regardless of the efforts that are made to explain it may be unrealistic. Woodford
(2005, p. 403) argues that: “Insofar as explanation of the policy rule to the public
does no harm under the assumption of rational expectations, but improves outcomes
under the (more realistic) assumption that a correct understanding of the central
bank’s policy commitments does not occur automatically, then it is clearly desirable
for the central bank to explain the rule that it follows.”
King (2005) goes even further and argues that the public may follow simple (but
possibly fairly robust) ‘heuristics’ in making decisions instead of following
optimizing behaviour. He argues that in this case central bank communication can
play an important role in leading people to choose heuristics of the right sort: “the
more the central bank can do to behave in a way that makes it easy for the private
sector to adopt a simple heuristic to guide expectations the better. A good heuristic
from that point of view would be ‘expect inflation to be equal to target’” (King 2005,
p. 12). In other words, by communicating to the public the central bank may help
anchoring expectations.
Second, most central banks do not follow a fixed rule. For example, ECB
president Jean-Claude Trichet has repeatedly stressed that the ECB takes its
decisions one step at a time. In the Q&A session after the interest rate decision on
2 March 2006, Trichet said: “We do not engage a priori in a series of interest rate
hikes...we do not pre-commit ourselves unconditionally.”
Third, financial-market participants generally do not have as much information as
monetary policymakers do about a number of key inputs to policymaking, including
the policymakers’ objectives, their assessment of the economic situation, and their
policy strategy. If there is asymmetric information, i.e., if the public and the central
bank dispose of different information, it may be perfectly rational for the public to
adjust their expectations if the central bank provides new information. Here we should
distinguish between the type of information that is provided by the central bank.
The central bank may provide information about its reaction function. This should
lead, ceteris paribus, to an increase in the private sector’s ability to forecast the central
bank’s policy decisions. Suppose, the central bank follows a Taylor-type rule,
rt ¼ r* þ pt þ ayt þ b pt  p*
 
ð1Þ
where r, r*, y, π and π* denote the interest rate, the target interest rate, the output gap,
inflation and target inflation, respectively. An improvement in the private sector’s
understanding of what values the central bank uses for r*, π*, α and β would lead to
improved private sector forecasts for rt (Swanson 2006). One possibility in countries
without explicit inflation targets is that the central bank may provide information about
its long-run inflation target (Kohn and Sack 2004). Likewise, central banks could also
provide information on the relative weights that the central bank places on its output
and inflation objectives. The parameter α is an important determinant of the speed
with which policy seeks to put inflation back on target following adverse shocks. The
larger is α, the larger is the “flexibility” allowed in returning to the inflation target
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following a shock. Hence, it determines the period-by-period deviations of inflation
from its target. Providing this kind of information may help the private sector to form
more accurate expectations. According to Trichet (2005), “If the central bank is able to
convince economic agents and markets participants of its analysis and assessment of
the outlook, and about the policy measures that it is going to take in response to it, this
mechanism of anticipation will act in self-equilibrating manner. As soon as the
macroeconomic news is released, expectations of the short-term interest rates will
adjust in the equilibrating direction that markets expect to see implemented by the
central bank.”
Bernanke (2004) refers to the recent literature on adaptive learning in explaining
why communication on these issues affects monetary policy effectiveness (see
Blinder et al. 2008 for a further discussion). When the public does not know but
instead must estimate the central bank’s reaction function, there is no guarantee that
the economy will converge to the optimal rational expectations equilibrium because
the public’s learning process itself affects the behaviour of the economy. The
feedback effect of learning on the economy can lead to unstable or indeterminate
outcomes. In such a setting, communication by the central bank may play a key role
in helping improve economic performance.
Furthermore, the central bank may have better information on the economic
outlook.3 Various studies find that financial markets not only react to macroeco-
nomic news (e.g. Balduzzi et al. 2001 for the case of the USA), but also to
information on the economic outlook provided by the central bank. Apparently
investors update their own views in response to the information conveyed by the
central bank. Kohn and Sack (2004) argue that private agents may lend special
credence to the economic pronouncements of the central bank, particularly if the
central bank has established credibility as an effective forecaster of the economy.
They point out that the Federal Reserve has been broadly correct on the direction of
the economy and prices over the past two decades, on occasion spotting trends and
developments before they were evident to market participants. This record has
enhanced its reputation and credibility.4
Even though there are good reasons why communication may be beneficial, it is
by no means clear what constitutes an optimal communication strategy. The
literature on central bank transparency has shown that full disclosure of all available
information is often not optimal. Unfortunately, the theoretical literature has not
come up with clear-cut conclusions regarding the optimal level of transparency
(Geraats 2002). In general, the central bank faces a trade-off when there are limits as
to how much information can be digested effectively (Kahnemann 2003). The trade-
off might become even more pronounced if the central bank communicates about
3 One of the referees suggested another difference, namely the asymmetry in the treatment of
macroeconomic information. Market participants have a monitoring horizon biased toward short-term
movements of financial markets, while the central bank analyzes every kind of economic development and
their short to medium-term impact on inflation and economic activity. As a consequence, market
participants have a limited ability to build proper data-driven economic scenarios consistent with the
central bank’s view of future inflation. Communication may help them forming a better view.
4 Romer and Romer (2000) provide statistical evidence that the Federal Reserve staff forecasts for output
and inflation have been more accurate than private sector forecasts over the past several decades.
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issues on which it receives noisy signals itself, such as the evolution of the economy
(as opposed to, e.g., its intentions regarding upcoming interest rate decisions). This
has been stressed by Amato et al. (2002) who argue that central bank communication
can co-ordinate the actions of financial market participants away from fundamentals,
in the sense that they attach too much weight to the central bank’s views, not taking
into account that they reflect a noisy signal. Blinder et al. (2008) present arguments
casting doubts on the validity of this argument.
3 The ECB’s Communication Policy
Central banks communicate about at least four different aspects of monetary policy:
their overall objectives and strategy, the motives behind a particular policy decision,
the economic outlook, and future monetary policy decisions. Central banks can
choose from a large menu of communication instruments, like press conferences,
minutes of the meetings of the decision-making council, monthly bulletins, speeches
and interviews.
The ECB mainly relies on four communication devices. The ECB’s most
important communication device is the President’s introductory statement at the
monthly press conference in which he reports on the decisions taken by the ECB’s
Governing Council. Following meetings of the Council, which typically take place
on the first Thursday of each month, the ECB announces the monetary policy
decisions at 13:45 (CET). Some 45 min later, at around 14:30, the ECB President
and Vice-President hold a press conference that comprises two elements: a prepared
introductory statement that contains the background considerations for the monetary
policy decision, and a Questions & Answers (Q&A) part during which the President
and the Vice-President are available to answer questions by the attending journalists.
The introductory statement is understood to reflect the position and views of the
Council, agreed upon on a word-by-word basis by its members. While providing
background information on the rationale for its decision, the ECB press conference
is generally less detailed than the minutes of the Bank of England or the Federal
Reserve (Blinder et al. 2008). In particular, it does not provide any information on
voting. However, the press conference avoids the substantial time delay of the
minutes. Furthermore, the Q&A session allows the press to ask follow-up questions
and thus can help clarify open issues (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007a).
A second important communication device for the ECB is itsMonthly Bulletin, which
is published 1 week after each monetary policy meeting and contains both the
assessment of economic developments and information on its analytical framework—
e.g., models, methods and indicators—used in the decision-making process. The
editorial of the Bulletin contains a short explanation of the interest rate decision of the
previous month and frequently includes a summary statement of the Governing
Council’s view of the economy.
The testimonies of the ECB President (or sometimes of other Executive Board
members) to the European Parliament (EP) offer also an opportunity to communi-
cate. Four times a year, the President appears before the EP’s Committee on
Economic and Monetary Affairs and explains the ECB’s policy decisions and its
economic outlook. Subsequently, he answers questions posed by Committee
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members. These testimonies are open to the public and the transcripts of the
presentations are published on the websites of both the EP and the ECB.
Finally, ECB officials often give speeches or interviews on monetary policy
making. Communications by individual central bankers offer greater flexibility in
timing than pre-scheduled events.5 Occasional speeches and interviews by individual
committee members between meetings offer a way to communicate changes in views
rapidly, if so desired (Blinder et al. 2008). Furthermore, in the case of the ECB,
national central banks feel they are responsible for explaining ECB policies to their
respective national audiences.
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007c) have analyzed the timing of communication by
individual ECB Governing Board members. Figure 1, which is reproduced from this
study, shows that except for days surrounding the monetary policy meetings, there is
a somewhat higher level of activity before than after meetings (which is statistically
significant at the 5% level), stressing the attempt of the ECB to prepare markets for
the upcoming meeting. Ehrmann and Fratzscher also find that when a policy surprise
is large (i.e., when its absolute value is above the average absolute surprise) ECB
officials are more talkative. Whereas the members of the Governing Council
normally talk to the public roughly every 7 (business) days, they do so more than
every 5 days if there has been a large surprise at the previous meeting.
When it comes to likely future policy decisions, many central banks provide some
sort of forward guidance, albeit in very different ways (see Blinder et al. 2008 for
5 Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b) report that 62.2% of communications on the monetary policy
inclination by individual ECB central bankers were in line with the next policy decision, while 82.3% of
these communications were in line with the next policy change.
Fig. 1 The timing of ECB communication. Notes: The vertical axis indicates the fraction of days in
which communication takes place. The bars aggregate data from 2 days (i.e., bar “−1” contains days 2 and
1 before a meeting of the decision-making body). The first and last bars additionally contain 22
observations on days beyond ±8. Source: Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007c)
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further details).6 The ECB uses indirect signals, often in the form of code words like
‘vigilance.’ However, the way this code word has been used has changed over time.
Between June 2003 and December 2005, the ECB maintained its main refinancing
rate at a level of 2%, but frequently voiced its concern about inflation. Trichet (2006,
p. 9) describes this strategy as follows: “Importantly, signalling vigilance proved
instrumental in reaching a common understanding with the markets: the ECB,
though observationally inactive, was at any time ready to start action.” After
December 2005, the ECB has tightened monetary policy in a number of consecutive
steps. Interestingly, the keyword ‘vigilance’ continued to be used in ECB
communication. However, the interpretation of ‘vigilance’ has changed as market
participants now regarded ‘vigilance’ as an indicator of upcoming policy changes.7
Decision-making in the ECB Governing Council is often described as being
‘collegial’ (see Blinder 2007). Also the communication strategy of the ECB has been
characterized as ‘collegial’; in comparison to the Federal Reserve, the communica-
tion of individual central bankers of the ECB is less diverse (Ehrmann and
Fratzscher 2007b). Still, there is quite some dispersion in ECB communication as
will be discussed in more detail in Section 6, where we will also examine whether
this dispersion affects the predictability of ECB interest rate decisions.
4 Measuring ECB Communication
Essentially three approaches have been developed in the literature to measure (the
effects) of central bank communication. Starting with Kohn and Sack (2004), various
studies have examined the effects of central bank communication events on the
volatility of financial variables. The basic idea is that, if communications affect the
returns on financial assets, the volatility of these returns should be higher on days of
central bank communications, ceteris paribus, because the signals contain “news.”
Focusing on volatility makes it unnecessary to assign a direction to each statement.
The most important weakness of this approach is that it cannot assess whether markets
moved in the “right” direction (see Blinder et al. 2008 for a further discussion). In
other words, the Kohn and Sack approach may establish that central bank
communication creates news, but it is unable to determine whether it reduces noise.
In the second approach, communication is quantified in order to assess both the
direction and magnitude of its effects on asset prices—and thus to determine to what
6 A few central banks even provide quantitative guidance by publishing the numerical path of future
policy rates that underlies their macroeconomic forecasts. Sweden and Iceland recently joined a small
group that includes New Zealand and Norway in doing so. As Blinder et al. (2008) point out, announcing
the path of the policy rate may complicate the central bank’s decision-making process. It may also
complicate communication with the public, which may not understand the conditional nature of the
projection. In practice, the main concern holding back many central bankers is that such communications
might be mistaken for commitments. If the projected developments do not materialize, the discrepancy
between actual and previously projected policy might damage the central bank’s credibility (Issing 2005).
7 According to Bloomberg, “ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet has used the word ‘vigilant’ to flag each
of the six rate increases since late 2005” (Bloomberg News, 15 February 2007). Likewise, according to
UBS: “Trichet has made a practice of effectively pre-announcing hikes at the prior meeting with the use of
the key ‘vigilant’ phrase’” (UBS FX Trade and Research, 9 January 2007).
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extent communication has its intended effects. Communications must be classified
according to their content and/or likely intention, and then coded on a numerical scale.
Negative (positive) values are assigned to communications that are perceived as dovish
(hawkish), and zero to those that appear to be neutral. Whereas some researchers restrict
the coding to directional indications by using a scale between −1 and +1 (e.g., Jansen
and DeHaan 2005, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007b), others assign a finer grid that is at
least suggestive of magnitude (Berger et al. 2006; Rosa and Verga 2007; Heinemann
and Ullrich 2007, and Musard-Gies 2006), e.g., by coding statements on a scale from
−2 to +2. The most important weakness of the second approach is that it is necessarily
subjective, and there may be misclassifications.
Recently, the Swiss KOF Institute started to publish its Monetary Policy
Communicator for the Euro Area (KOF MPC) that provides a quantitative measure
of ECB communication.8 It translates the ECB President’s statements concerning
risks to price stability as made during the monthly press conference into an index.
By aggregating forward-looking statements concerning price stability, the KOF MPC
contains information about the future path of ECB monetary policy. The KOF MPC
is based on a coding of each introductory statement provided by Media Tenor, a
media research institute. Media analysts read the text of the introductory statement of
the monthly press conference sentence by sentence. Each sentence contains one or
more statements, which are then coded. The coding is aggregated into the index by
taking balances of the statements that reveal that the ECB sees upside risks to price
stability and statements that reveal that the ECB sees downside risks to price
stability, relative to all statements about price stability (including neutral). By
construction, the values of the KOF MPC are restricted to be in the range of minus
one to plus one. The larger a positive (negative) value of the KOF MPC, the stronger
the ECB communicated that there are upside (downside) risks for price stability.
Finally, in the approach first suggested by Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and
Gürkaynak (2005) and also implemented in Brand et al. (2006), indirect measures
derived from financial market reactions are employed. Brand et al. (2006) make use
of the timing details of the ECB’s meeting day communications. The ECB
announces its decisions at 1:45 P.M., without any explanatory statements, and then
explains the decisions in detail in the press conference 45 min later. Because of that
delay, the market reaction to the release of the decision can be separated from the
market reaction to the forward-looking communication by using high-frequency data
(see also Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007a).
As pointed out before, one of the potential drawbacks of the second approach as
described above is its subjectivity. Researchers have to code the communications by
the ECB and that may lead to different results for various reasons. First, researchers
may base their coding on different communication devices. Second, they may
interpret the same information differently.9 To examine this issue in some detail, we
have gathered various indicators that are all based on the second approach as
outlined in the previous section. Figure 2 plot the indicators that were available.
8 Available at: http://www.kof.ethz.ch/publications/indicators/communicator/en
9 In the study by Berger et al. (2006), three different teams coded the introductory statements by the ECB
President and this yielded some remarkable differences, especially with respect to the interpretation of
comments referring to monetary aggregates.
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Apart from the Ehrmann–Fratzscher and the Jansen–DeHaan indicators, all
indicators use the introductory statement by the ECB President during the press
conference following the Governing Council meeting.
It becomes very clear that the various indicators differ substantially from each
other. Still, the correlation among most indicators is quite high (Table 1). The
exception is the KOF index that shows a remarkably low correlation with the other
indicators. A possible reason is that the KOF index is more forward-looking and
more focused on price stability than the other indicators.
5 The Impact of ECB Communication on Financial Markets
An important line of research focuses on the impacts of central bank communica-
tions on financial markets. The basic idea is that, if communications steer
expectations, asset prices should react and policy decisions should become more
predictable. Table 2 summarizes various recent studies on the financial market
effects of ECB communication.
Table 2 shows that there is a broad consensus on many issues. First, ECB
communication clearly moves financial markets. There is substantive evidence that
various forms of ECB communication lead to more volatility. This holds true for
short-term interest rates (Sebestyén and Sicilia 2005), the bond market (Andersson et
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Fig. 2 Comparing various indicators of ECB communication
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If more than one communication device is considered, the strongest effects are
generally found for the introductory statements by the ECB President at the press
conference following the Governing Council’s meeting (Connolly and Kohler 2004
and Sebestyén and Sicilia 2005). Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a) analyze whether
the press conferences provide additional information, beyond that explaining a given
decision. If a policy decision contains all relevant information for market
participants, markets should not show any systematic movement during press
conferences. The separation of the release of the decision from its explanation allows
separating the effect of monetary policy decisions from the accompanying
communication. These authors find that the size of the market reaction to press
conference is, on average, substantially larger than the reaction to the policy decision
itself, while the press conference at the same time exerts lower effects on market
volatility. The market reaction to the press conference is related to the characteristics
of the decision: the less well a decision has been anticipated by the market, the
stronger is the reaction to the introductory statement. Especially statements
containing a reference to inflationary developments and responses to questions
regarding interest rate discussions at the Governing Council meeting have substantial
effects on markets.
In conclusion, studies focusing on volatility suggest that financial markets clearly
respond to ECB communication. However, as pointed out before, studies following
this approach cannot assess whether markets moved in the direction as intended by
the central bank.
Second, studies that have coded ECB communication yield evidence that
communication moves financial markets in the intended direction. For instance,
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b) find that statements suggesting tightening lead to
higher rates, while statements suggesting easing lead to lower rates. Statements on
monetary policy inclinations move interest rates by 1.5–2.5 basis points. Musard-
Gies (2006) finds similar results, although the short end of the yield curve reacts
more sharply to statements than the long end. Using a different approach, Brand et
al. (2006) find that the effect of the ECB’s communications is particularly sizable at
the long end of the yield curve. In contrast, Brière and Ielpo (2007) conclude that
ECB policy rate announcements affect only the very short segment of the curve.
These authors argue that the main reason why they find that long-term rates are
hardly affected is that they better control for the influence of the US economy.10
Third, there is much evidence suggesting that ECB communications increase the
predictability of interest decisions by the Governing Council.11 A good example of a
study yielding this outcome is Rosa and Verga (2007). These authors conclude that
the forecasting ability of communication by the ECB (measured on the basis of the
10 Other studies capture the US influence by including both European and American economic
announcements in the regression used to explain European interest rates. However, the US yield-curve
changes even in the absence of any economic announcements in the US. The authors therefore analyze the
influence of the entire American yield curve on European rates.
11 Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b) examine whether 1 month EONIA swap rates change on days of
policy decisions, thereby testing whether policy decisions were expected. This, however, does not provide
direct evidence that the predictability is the outcome of effective communication.
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introductory statements of the ECB President) is similar to the one implied by
market-based measures of monetary policy expectations.
However, there is less agreement as to whether communication adds information
compared to the information contained by variables typically included in a Taylor-
rule model.12 In other words, it is not entirely clear to what extent ECB
communication adds information that helps to predict interest rate decisions.
Heinemann and Ullrich (2007) find that their communication index, based on the
wording of the introductory statements by the ECB President at the press conference
following Governing Council meetings, adds information not provided by Taylor-
rule variables. Also Rosa and Verga (2007) conclude that words and data on
macroeconomic variables are essentially complements, rather than substitutes.
However, Jansen and De Haan (2008) conclude that during the first years of the
EMU straightforward Taylor rule models outperform models that only use
communication indicators. More importantly, the information content of the
statements was mainly a reflection of macroeconomic developments. If these
authors control for this effect, communication has little value added for explaining
future decisions. In other words, communication and macroeconomic variables are
substitutes instead of complements.
To sum up and coming back to the questions that we raised in the Introduction—
i.e., has ECB communication affected interest rates and has it increased the
predictability of policy decisions? —the empirical evidence suggests that the answer
to both questions is a qualified ‘yes’.
However, impact on financial markets and high predictability of policy decisions
are necessary but not sufficient conditions for successful and effective communica-
tion as communication policy should also aim at anchoring and guiding market
expectations over the medium to long run (Issing 2005). As the main objective of the
ECB is price stability, an important issue is to what extent communication can help
anchoring inflation expectations. According to ECB President Trichet, the upward
move in Euro area inflation expectations in late 2003—when the policy rate was
being held at an exceptionally low level—was reversed by the ECB’s communica-
tion becoming increasingly alert (‘vigilant’) to the inflation risks generated by the
move in inflation expectations: “stability in long term inflation expectations was
restored without engineering policy actions” (Trichet 2005).
Only three studies that we are aware of have examined the impact of the ECB’s
communication on inflation expectations. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b, c)
examine the impact of communication on 5-year inflation expectations derived
from indexed bonds and find that their measures do not have a significant impact on
inflation expectations. Jansen and De Haan (2007b) find evidence that communi-
cation by the ECB regarding risks to price stability (measured by the frequency and
12 As Bernanke and Boivin (2003) point out, most empirical analyses of monetary policy have been
confined to frameworks in which the central bank is implicitly assumed to exploit only a limited amount
of information, like in the Taylor-rule model. In practice, the central banks’ approach to data analysis
typically mixes the use of large macro-econometric models, smaller statistical models, heuristic and
judgmental analyses, and informal weighting of information from diverse sources. One way of interpreting
central bank communication may be that it summarizes the central bank’s assessment of all the
information it employs. In that case, models using central bank communication should outperform those
that rely only on a limited number of macro variables.
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strength of the key word ‘vigilance’) between June 2003 and December 2005—a
period during which the ECB did not change its policy rates—reduced high-
frequency inflationary expectations slightly in the second half of 2005, when a
change in the ECB’s policy stance became increasingly likely. To some extent, their
results lend support to Trichet’s (2005) claim that communication has helped
stabilize inflation expectations without a policy change. However, the reported
impact is quite small so that it is clear that other factors also played a crucial role in
stabilizing these expectations. Furthermore, the impact is only significant for the
period when an interest rate hike became more likely. In other words, communi-
cation works best when supported by (a credible threat of) deeds.
6 New Evidence on the Impact of Communication Dispersion
on the Predictability of ECB Policy Decisions13
In the previous section we have shown that ECB communication has enhanced the
predictability of policy decisions. Still, there is a danger that too many disparate
voices might confuse rather than enlighten the public—especially if the messages
appear to conflict. If done poorly, uncoordinated group communication might
actually lower, rather than raise, the signal-to-noise ratio. We have examined this
issue using a content analysis of reports from the news-wire Bloomberg. We have
collected reports on comments by leading euro area central bankers, such as
members of the ECB’s Executive Board and the presidents of national central
banks.14 We focus on ECB statements on the main refinancing rate, the outlook for
euro area inflation, and the outlook for euro area economic growth. Per topic, we
classify each comment on a ternary scale (−1, 0, +1). For example, statements
suggesting a tightening of monetary policy are coded +1, whereas statements hinting
at interest rate cuts are coded −1. We measure dispersion in communication by
computing the standard deviation of the coded statements. The event window is
always equal to the period between two subsequent ECB interest rate meetings. The
sample period is 6 May 1999 to 2 May 2002. This period is interesting as both the
ECB and financial markets had to learn how to deal with communication by a newly
created international organization. As shown in Fig. 3, notably ECB statements on
the outlook for inflation and economic growth were inconsistent, with the degree of
inconsistency somewhat increasing over time.
We evaluate the effects of dispersion on predictability by using survey data on
interest rate expectations. These expectations are taken from the Reuters poll of
forecasters. The use of these data instead of market-based expectations allows us to
examine the impact of communication dispersion on market uncertainty as reflected
in the dispersion of the views of the forecasters. Before each ECB interest rate
decision, Reuters polls key economists on their views on the main refinancing rate
after the upcoming meeting. We study the effects of inconsistent communication
using three characteristics of the survey data. First, we examine whether the absolute
13 This part of the paper is based on an unpublished note written together with David-Jan Jansen.
14 The dataset is described in more detail in Jansen and De Haan (2005).
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Fig. 3 Dispersion in comments by euro area central bankers. Note: The figures show the degree of
dispersion in comments on i the ECB main refinancing rate, ii euro area inflation and iii euro area
economic growth. Dispersion is measured as the standard deviation of the coded statements. The sample
period is 6 May 1999 to 2 May 2002. The dates correspond to the occurrence of ECB interest rate changes
(DD/MM/YY). The circles on the x-axis indicate that there was more than one comment on a specific
topic during the event window, but no inconsistency between the comments
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difference between the actual decision and the median of the Reuters survey is
positively related to dispersion in communication.15 Second, we study whether the
percentage of incorrect predictions is positively related to dispersion. Finally, we
examine whether the standard deviation of the expected interest rates is positively
related to dispersion.16
In all three cases, following Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) we rely on a tobit
specification to account for the fact that the dependent variables are censored. In the
first and third case, the censoring is at the value zero, in the second case, the
dependent variable is censored at zero and one. Finally, we account for the fact that
communication is not the only factor that influences predictability. We do this by
using the standard deviation of a daily series of 1-month Euribor rates in the week
before the one in which the interest rate decision is made to control for
macroeconomic uncertainty.17
Table 3 shows tobit estimation results where the dependent variable is either the
absolute prediction error (column 1), the fraction of incorrect predictions (column 2)
or the standard deviation of expected interest rates (column 3).
15 We have also used the mean instead of the median of the survey and the results are qualitatively very
similar.
16 As pointed out by one of the referees, this implies that we do not separate volatility in asset prices from
moves (jumps) in asset prices (see Jondeau et al. 2006 for a further discussion). We leave this issue for
future research.
17 We also estimated specifications with a linear trend as, over the years, the ECB may have become more
predictable. This did not affect the results.
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We find that dispersion on the inflation outlook influences predictability as
measured by the absolute prediction error, while inconsistencies in statements on the
main refinancing rate and the outlook for economic growth are not related to the
absolute prediction error (column 1). We also find a positive relationship between
dispersion in comments on inflation and the degree of incorrect interest rate
predictions (column 2). The marginal effect in this case is equal to 0.21 (p=0.03)
which implies a sizeable effect of dispersion on predictability. Finally, there is a
strong indication that dispersion leads to higher levels of uncertainty as the
coefficient for the variable measuring dispersion in inflation comments is highly
significant (column 3). The marginal effect in this case is equal to 0.07 (p=0.00).
7 Conclusions
A substantial body of research has examined the impact of ECB communication on
financial markets. The basic underlying idea of this research is that, if communi-
cations steer expectations, asset prices should react and policy decisions should
become more predictable. Theoretically, central banks communications may affect
asset prices if one or more of the following conditions hold: non-rational
expectations, absence of policy rules and credibility, and asymmetric information.
Even though there are good reasons why communication may be beneficial, it is by
no means clear what constitutes an optimal communication strategy.
The ECB mainly relies on four communication devices. The ECB’s most
important communication device is the President’s introductory statement at the
monthly press conference in which he reports on the decisions taken by the ECB’s
Governing Council. Other instruments used are: the Monthly Bulletin, testimonies
before the European Parliament, and speeches and interviews of individual members
of the Governing Council.









Dispersion in comments on
Main refinancing rate 0.06 (0.29) −0.01 (0.25) 0.02 (0.04)
Euro area inflation 0.44a (0.22) 0.41b (0.20) 0.11c (0.03)
Euro area economic growth 0.07 (0.18) 0.17 (0.15) 0.03 (0.03)
Standard deviation 1-month Euribor 3.88b (1.84) 4.50b (1.79) 0.88c (0.31)
Constant −0.67b (0.17) −0.28b (0.13) −0.04b (0.02)
Chi2 LR-test 6.1 12.2b 19.4c
Number of observations 65 65 65
Percentage of censored observations 70.5 43.1 41.5
Standard errors in parenthesis. The sample period is 6 May 1999 to 2 May 2002. All results use robust
Huber–White standard-errors
a Significance at the 10% level
b Significance at the 5% level
c Significance at the 1% level
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Various studies have shown that ECB communication moves financial markets.
There is substantive evidence that various forms of ECB communication lead to
more volatility. This holds true for short-term interest rates, the bond market, the
stock market, and the swap markets. If more than one communication device is
considered, the strongest effects are generally found for the introductory statements
by the ECB President at the press conference following the Governing Council’s
meeting. However, studies focusing on volatility cannot assess whether markets
moved in the intended direction. To analyze whether this is the case, researchers
have coded ECB communications. Studies using this approach yield evidence that
communications generally move financial markets in the intended direction. There is
also substantive evidence that ECB communications increase the predictability of
interest decisions by the Governing Council. However, there is less agreement as to
whether communication adds information compared to the information contained by
variables typically included in a Taylor-rule like model. In other words, it is not
entirely clear to what extent ECB communication adds information that helps to
predict interest rate decisions.
Even though predictability and market impact of communication are necessary, they
are not sufficient conditions for successful and effective communication as communi-
cation policy should also aim at anchoring and guiding market expectations over the
medium to long run. Some recent research suggests that communication by the ECB
regarding risks to price stability reduced high-frequency inflationary expectations
slightly. However, the reported impact is quite small so that it is clear that other factors
also played a crucial role in stabilizing these expectations. Furthermore, the impact is
only significant for the period when an interest rate hike became more likely. In other
words, communication works best when supported by (a credible threat of) deeds.
Finally, we discuss the consequences of the fact that ECB officials often gave
contrasting signals to market participants. These diverging signals were related to various
aspects of monetary policy, such as the policy inclination, or the economic outlook. It is
likely that this dispersion affects the ability of market participants to correctly predict
monetary policy decisions. Using statements by euro area central bankers as reported by
Bloomberg, we find that inconsistent communication on the inflation outlook coincides
with greater uncertainty regarding upcoming ECB interest rate decisions. Dispersion in
communication is also positively related to prediction errors. Our results, therefore,
suggest that inconsistencies in central bank communication matter. When different
central bankers convey diverging information, uncertainty about upcoming decisions
increases. In addition, agents make less accurate predictions. The policy implication is
that central bankers should take care that their statements are consistent.
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